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Dyre: Indian Law - State Regulation of Liquor Transactions on Indian Re
INDIAN LAW-State Regulation of Liquor Transactions On Indian Reserva103 S.Ct. 3291 (1983).
U.S. -,
tions. Rice v. Rehner, During its most recent term, the Supreme Court was again called upon
to define the permissible limits of state regulatory authority over Indian
reservations.' The latest controversy arose when Eva Rehner, a federally
licensed Indian trader operating a general store within the Pala Reservation, sought an exemption from California law requiring a license for the
sale of liquor for off-premises consumption. When the exemption was
denied, Ms. Rehner filed suit in federal district court for a declaratory judgment that she was exempt from the state licensing requirement. The
district court dismissed the suit, holding that 18 U.S.C. section 11612 required her to obtain a state license. 3
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the decision was reversed on the ground that section 1161 preempted state
jurisdiction over liquor sales occurring within Indian reservations. 4 The appellate court based its decision on two aspects of section 1161: First,
because liquor transactions have historically been under federal control, an
express grant of state jurisdiction was necessary before the state could impose licensing requirements., Second, since section 1161 had given the Indians the authority to prescribe their own ordinances, subject to federal approval and certification, the tribal regulatory authority was safeguarded by
federal supervision.6 This combination of tribal self-regulation and federal
supervision indicated a congressional scheme which left no room for additional burdens imposed by state law.'
In a six-to-three decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court's decision, holding that section 1161 did not preempt
state law, but instead authorized state regulation of tribal liquor transactions." The Court also noted that in the narrow area of liquor transactions,
the Indian tribes had been divested of any inherent right of selfgovernment. 9 Therefore, it was not necessary that Congress expressly provide for state regulatory authority.' 0 The Court also held that even if there
was a tradition of tribal sovereignty which required an express grant of
state regulatory authority, section 1161 met that requirement."
1. Rice v. Rehner, U.S.
., 103 S.Ct. 3291 (1983).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) provides:
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3618, of this title, shall
not apply within any area that is not Indian country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian country provided such act or transaction is in
conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over
such area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior, and
published in the Federal Register.
3. 103 S.Ct. at 3293.
4. Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1351 (9th Cir. 1982).
5. Id. at 1343.
6. Id. at 1349.
7. Id. at 1349 (citing Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685,
689-91 (1965)).
8. 103 S.Ct. at 3293.
9. Id. at 3297-98.
10. Id. at 3295.
11. Id. at 3302.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Rice v. Rehner is the latest in a long line of cases defining the limitation
on the state power to regulate Indian reservations. The principles applied
in making this determination have not, however, remained static.
The Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
The Indian tribes were once independent nations in what is now the
United States. 12 Although much of the aboriginal sovereignty associated
with their historical status has been lost through conquest or surrendered
in return for federal protection and aid, the Indian tribes retain attributes
of sovereignty over their members and their territory.'3 They possess a
unique status, occupying "a semi-independent position ... not as States,
not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as
a separate people with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they resided."' 14
Early United States Supreme Court decisions recognized that the
sovereignty retained by the tribes gave them the authority to regulate their
internal matters free from state interference. This view was expressed by
Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia,'5 which held that Indian
reservations were distinct communities in which state laws could have no
force.1 6 Although reliance on tribal sovereignty as a barrier to state regulation has diminished in recent years, the principle that Indian tribes have
the authority to regulate their internal and social relations without state interference remains operative. For example, this principle was recently applied by the Supreme Court in McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Commission,"Iwhere the Court held that a state could not tax reservation Indians
on income derived solely from reservation sources; and in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,19 which held that
states cannot tax an Indian's personal property located within a reservation. Although the Supreme Court has consistently guarded the right of
tribal self-government,20 the view that state law can never have force
within a reservation has been rejected.2' This change in position was
prompted by recognition of the states' interest in regulating the activities
of non-Indians occurring within reservations. 22 In the landmark decision of
Williams v. Lee,2 3 the Court formulated a new test to be applied when
legitimate state regulatory interests were present: "Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question [is] whether the state action infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
71 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 561.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
411 U.S. 165 (1973).
447 U.S. 138 (1980).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481-83 (1976).
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 165, 171 (1973).
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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4

Although this test has seen limited application, 2 "the

right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them" 6 still stands as a barrier to the application of state law to activities
27
occurring within the reservation or undertaken by tribal members.
The Shift to the FederalPreemption Doctrine
In recent years, the trend has been away from tribal sovereignty as a
bar to state regulation and toward a reliance on federal preemption.28 A
major reason for this shift is that there are few, if any, cases in which
federal treaties and statutes do not define the boundaries of federal and
state jurisdiction.2 9 The preferred analysis now involves ascertaining all
federal enactments pertaining to the activity at issue and then determining
if these enactments preempt state regulation. 0 Unfortunately, there are
no rigid rules which can be applied in making the preemption determination.31 "The unique . . . origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally

unhelpful to apply... those standards of preemption [which] have emerged
in other areas of the law." 2 The Supreme Court attempted to provide
guidance in this area in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket" by setting forth a specific preemption test to be used when a state attempts to
exert regulatory authority over Indian reservations. This test calls for "a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the '8specific
4
context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.
The FederalInterest
The federal government has two general interests at stake in the area
of tribal regulation. The first of these arises from treaties with the individual tribes. As noted previously, the Indian tribes surrendered a portion of their independence in exchange for federal protection. The treaties
involved in this process generally promised, either expressly or by implication, that the tribes would be subject only to the federal government, not
the states. 36 These treaties also contained provisions covering such areas as
the Indians' rights in ceded land, criminal and civil jurisdiction of reservations, and control of tribal affairs 86 The federal government is obligated to
protect these rights from state interference. 7 For example, in Williams v.
Lee,8 8 the tribe had been granted the right to maintain tribal courts. The attempted assertion of state jurisdiction over controversies arising within the
reservation was held to be invalid as an impermissible infringement on this
tribal right granted by treaty.
24. Id. at 220.
25. Mundell, The Tribal Sovereignty Limitation on the Taxation of the Indians: From
Worcester & Confederated Tribes and Beyond, 15 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 145, 200 (1982).
26. 358 U.S. at 220.
27. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
28. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 165, 172 (1973).
29. Id. at 172 n.8.
30. Id. at 172.
31. White Mountain Apache Tribe v,Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
32. Id. at 143.
33. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
34. Id. at 145.
35. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 117 (1942).
36. Id. at 33.

37. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959).
38. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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The second federal interest is derived from the tribes' status as wards
of the nation. s9 In an attempt to end the tribes' reliance on the federal
government, Congress has enacted statutes under the Indian commerce41
clause 40 designed to promote tribal self-government and self-sufficiency.
State law which conflicts
with these policies will be struck down by the
42
supremacy clause.
In White MountainApache Tribe v. Bracker,'4 this rationale was used
to invalidate a motor carrier tax imposed on logging trucks engaged in
lumber operations within the Fort Apache Reservation. Federal regulation, in the form of federal statutes, regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior, and day-to-day supervision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs were held to be so pervasive that there was no room for state
taxation. 44 In addition, imposition of these taxes would threaten the overriding federal objectives of ensuring that profits would inure to the tribe .45
The Tribal Interest
The switch to preemption analysis does not mean that tribal sovereignty is no longer a barrier to state regulation of Indian reservations. The
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that a state law cannot "[infringe] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."' 46 However, the right of Indian self-government is not absolute, but instead must be weighed against the states' interest in asserting
regulatory authority. 47 Therefore, tribal sovereignty plays a role in
preemption analysis, not because it provides a definitive resolution but by
informing the determination of whether state authority has been preempted by federal law by providing a backdrop against which applicable federal
statutes and treaties must be read. 48 Ambiguities must be "construed
generously to comport with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.' 4 9 Therefore, an express preemption by Congress is not
necessary. 0
39. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 159 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
40. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, n.10 (1980). In note 10, the
Court set forth a portion of the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543
which states in part: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress.. to help
develope and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own
resources."
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
44. Id. at 148.
45. Id. at 149. See Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) where the
Court held a state tax on gross income could not be applied to a federally licensed Indian
trader because a tax would disarray the statutory plan Congress had devised to protect
the Indians.
46. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). This principle has recently been cited by the
,, 103 S.Ct. 2378,
Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, - U.S. 103 S.Ct. 3291, 3294 (1983).
2385 (1983); and Rice v. Rehner, - U.S. -,.
47. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
48. Id. at 172.
49. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).
50. Id. at 144.
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A related rule of construction involves congressional delegation of
regulatory power to the states. Since tribal sovereignty is subject to complete defeasance by Congress,5 1 the federal government has the power to
delegate portions of its regulatory power to the states. However, when
there is a tradition of sovereign immunity from state regulation in a particular area, that immunity can only be repealed by explicit congressional
directive. 2 In Bryan v. Itasca County, " the Court held that the history of
immunity from state taxation of property located within a reservation required a more explicit grant4 of state jurisdiction than was present in the
controlling federal statute .
The State Interest
"When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is of issue, state
law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to
be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government
is at its strongest." 55 More difficult questions arise when non-Indians
engage in activities on the reservation.5 6 In the area of state taxation, for
example, a showing that the tax imposed has a relation to some services
provided to reservation Indians will support the validity of state regulation,
but a generalized interest in raising revenue alone is normally not
sufficient.5 7
Alternatively, if the state demonstrates that activities occurring within
the reservation cause off-reservation problems which require state intervention, an assertion of state regulatory power may be upheld.68 For example, in Payallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dept.,59 the Court
found the State of Washington to have jurisdiction to regulate fishing activities on the reservation. As an important consideration in the case, the
Court cited the substantial state interest in conserving the steelhead trout
population. A further factor was the large amount of state funds spent in
maintaining fish hatcheries to promote the preservation of the species.
Since the Indian fishermen were also deriving benefits from these state expenditures, the state could show a substantial interest in applying its
fishing laws to reservation members.6 0
THE PRINCIPAL CASE: RICE V. REHNER

In Rice v. Rehner, the Supreme Court addressed whether California
could require a federally licensed Indian trader, operating a general store
on a reservation, to obtain a state license for the sale of liquor for offpremises consumption. 61 The specific issue was the applicability of the
51. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
52. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973) (citing U.S. DEPT.OF
THE INTERIOR, FederalIndian Law 845 (1958)).
53. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
54. Id. at 391-93.
55. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 150.
U.S....
103 S.Ct. 2378, 2387
58. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, -

(1983).

59. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
60. Id. at 175-76.
61. 103 S.Ct. at 3293.
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licensing requirement to liquor sales made to members of the reservation.6 2
The resolution of this issue depended on the proper construction of the controlling federal statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1161, which provides:
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3618
[federal statutes establishing criminal sanctions and procedures for
Indian country liquor violations] of this title, shall not apply within
any area that is not Indian country, nor to any act or transaction
within any area of Indian country provided such act or transaction
is in conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or
transactionoccurs and with an ordinanceduly adopted by the tribe
having jurisdictionover such area of Indian country, certified by
the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal
Register."3
The particular language in question was that requiring liquor transactions to conform to state law. Although the parties agreed that this provision requires conformity with state substantive law," 4 it was uncertain
whether it also constituted a delegation
to the states of regulatory authori66
ty over tribal liquor transactions.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that California licensing requirements could be applied to the Pala Reservation. In reaching this
decision, the Court construed section 1161 not as preempting state law, but
instead as expressly granting regulatory authority to the states. 66
The Court began by determining the backdrop of tribal sovereignty to
be used to inform the preemption analysis. The Court limited its examination to whether the Indian tribes had traditionally regulated tribal liquor
transactions.6 7 Since liquor transactions had historically been under comprehensive federal regulation, the Court held that there could be no tradition of tribal sovereignty.68 For the same reason, there was no tradition of
sovereign immunity which would require an express congressional grant to
the state of regulatory authority."g Because there was no history of tribal
self-government over liquor laws, and because of the substantial state interest in regulating liquor sales and distribution, the Court concluded that
little if any weight should be given to the tribal sovereignty interest when
making the preemption determination.70
The Court also rejected the contention that United States v. Mazurie7'
established tribal sovereignty in the area of liquor transactions. 72 Mazurie
62. The Court cited Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) as resolving the
licensing requirement as applied to non-Indians. Id. at 3296 n.7. Moe held that a state may
impose a nondiscriminatroy tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers conducting
business on a reservation, and may require Indians retailers to collect the tax.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) as quoted in Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir. 1982).
(Emphasis added).
64. 103 S.Ct. 3291 at 3307 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 3303 n. 18.
66. Id. at 3299.
67. Id. at 3396.
68. Id. at 3297.
69. Id. at 3299.
70. Id. at 3298.
71. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
72. 103 S.Ct. at 3296, 3301.
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held that the Wind River Indians had the authority to require persons selling liquor within the reservation to obtain a tribal liquor license. In Rice,
the Court held that the power recognized in Mazurie did not come from
powers inherent in tribal sovereignty, but was a result of a delegation of
federal power through the provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 1161.73 Mazurie
tribes possessed sufficient authority to exercise
only held that the Indian
74
Congress' delegation.
The second part of the opinion involved interpretation of the applicable
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1161.16 The Court's examination of the
plain language 76 and legislative history77 of section 1161 led it to conclude
that Congress had intended to authorize, rather than preempt, state
regulation of tribal liquor transactions. 781 As further support of its interpretation, the Court cited the history of concurrent state and federal
regulation of tribal liquor transactions as an indication that the federal
government had not intended to retain exclusive jurisdiction of this area.7 9
Since the states had been permitted and even required to impose regulations related to liquor transactions, the assumption that the states have no
power to regulate within the reservations would be unwarranted. 80
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The Court began its opinion by examining the tribal sovereignty interests at stake. 81 As mentioned previously,82 the tradition of tribal selfgovernment plays two major roles in preemption analysis. First, it provides
83
a backdrop against which the applicable federal statutes must be read.
Any ambiguities in federal statutes must be construed generously in order
to comport with traditional notions of tribal sovereignty and the federal
policy of encouraging tribal independence.8 4 In addition, case law has
recognized certain areas, such as state taxation, in which the Indian tribes
are immune from state regulation.8 5 In these areas, state regulation will be
prohibited unless expressly authorized by Congress. Repeal of this immunity by implication is not favored.88
In Rice v. Rehner, the Court appeared to confuse the separate notions
of the right of tribal self-government and the tradition of tribal immunity
72. 103 S.Ct. at 3296, 3301.
73. Id. at 3301.
74. Id. Congress does not have unlimited authority to delegate its legislative power. They
cannot delegate to private, voluntary organizations, for example. However, since the Indian tribes possess a certain amount of independent authority over their internal affairs,
the Congressional delegation was upheld. Id.
75. See supra note 2.
76. 103 S.Ct. at 3301.
77. Id. at 3299.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3297.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3296.
82. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
83. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
84. Id. at 174-75 and n.13.
85. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1976), where the Court found a tradition of sovereign immunity from state personal property tax.
86. Id. at 392.
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from state regulation by stating that: "[tihe 'backdrop' in this case concerns the licensing and distribution of alcoholic beverages. '87 Although
limiting the examination of tribal sovereignty in this manner is appropriate
when determining whether a tradition of tribal immunity from state
regulation is present, the backdrop of tribal sovereignty as used in preemption analysis is not limited to looking solely toward a tradition of tribal
regulation of the area in question. When the preemption analysis was first
formulated, the Court noted: "[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty over the
reservationand tribalmembers must inform the determination whether the
exercise of state authority has been preempted by operation of federal
law." 88 This principle was derived from the Court's earlier decision in
Williams v. Lee,8 9 where the Court held that state law could not be applied
within a reservation if it would infringe "on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them."9 0 It is the general right of
tribal self-government which provides a backdrop "against which . . .
federal enactments must always be measured.""'
As the dissent in Rice pointed out, preemption analysis "has never
turned on whether the particular area being regulated is one traditionally
within the tribe's control." 92 In previous cases, the Court has not found it
relevant that Indians have not traditionally been involved in education, 98
cigarette sales, 94 or the operation of ski areas.9 5 The majority's response
was that the actualfederal divestment of tribal authority over liquor transactions distinguished Rice from cases where there simply had never been9a6
tradition of tribal immunity from state regulation in a particular area.
This response confused the separate notions of tribal immunity from state
regulation and the general right of reservation Indians "to make their own
rules and be governed by them." 97
It is the latter notion, which is not dependent on a tradition of tribal
regulation in the particular area in question, that is used to inform the
preemption determination. Therefore, the Court incorrectly defined the
"backdrop" of tribal sovereignty as tribal regulation of liquor transactions
rather than the general right to self-government.
The majority's analysis of tribal sovereignty can be seen as a resultoriented approach designed to insure that state regulation would be permitted. The notion of tribal sovereignty encompasses more than a determination of whether there is a tradition of tribal immunity in the particular
87. 103 S.Ct. at 3296.
88. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). (Emphasis added).
89. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
90. Id. at 220.
91. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
92. 103 S.Ct. at 3305 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Buraeu of Revenue of New Mexico, U.S. -'
102 S.Ct. 3394 (1982), holding that a state could not impose a tax on the construction of
an Indian School. Id. at 3396-97.
94. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1978), holding that a state could not require the operator of an on-reservation "smoke shop" to obtain a state cigarette license.
Id. at 480-81.
95. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), where the Court held that a state
could not impose a use tax on property installed in ski lifts at a tribal resort. Id. at 158.
96. 103 S.Ct. at 3298.
97. 358 U.S. at 220.
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area in question. It serves as an independent barrier to state regulation
when the assertion of state authority would infringe on the basic right "of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."9 8
In addition, tribal sovereignty provides a backdrop against which the
applicable federal statute must be read. 99 By limiting its examination to the
specific area of liquor transactions, the Court removed the potential barrier
of the tribe's right to self-government. Since liquor transactions had
historically been under comprehensive federal regulation, there could not
have been a finding of a tradition of tribal sovereignty in this area. 100 By
redefining the sovereignty "backdrop" to ignore the general right to selfgovernment, the Court simply defined out of existence a preemption consideration which may have prevented the state from regulating liquor
sales.
Had the Court used the traditional view of tribal sovereignty as the
right of reservation Indians to govern themselves, it is clear that tribal
sovereignty would have played a greater role in the Court's decision. Since
California limits the number of liquor licenses it distributes, the tribe may
not be able to obtain a license. 10' This would prevent the tribe from passing
its own ordinances pertaining to the sale of liquor within the reservation.
This clearly infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them, and should have stood as a potential barrier to
state regulation.
The majority's decision can, however, be reconciled with prior case
law. The Indian tribes' right to self-government is not absolute, but must
be weighed against any state regulatory interests.10 2 Preemption analysis
involves balancing the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake. 0 3 The
state's regulatory interest may outweigh the tribal interest in selfgovernment. The Court is most likely to allow state regulation if there are
"off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention."' 1 4 Tribal liquor sales can have a significant impact outside the reservation. Liquor
sold within the reservation can easily flow "out of the reservation and into
the hands of those whom ... the State does not wish to possess alcoholic
beverages, or to possess them through a distribution network over which
the State has no control."' 0 5 Therefore, the need for state regulation
outweighs the tribal interest in retaining its right of self-government.
There is language in the opinion which suggests that this was the approach
actually used by the Court: "[because ... we must consider that the [sale of
liquor] potentially has a substantial impact beyond the reservation, we may
accord little if any weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty in
this case."' 10 6
98. 448 U.S. at 142-43 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
99. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). See supranotes 44-52
and accompanying text.
100. 103 S.Ct. at 3296-97.
101. Id. at 3296.
102. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
103. Id. at 145.
104. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

(1983).

__

U.S.

103 S.Ct. 2378, 2387

105. 103 S.Ct. at 3298.
106. Id.
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It is unclear whether Rice v. Rehner can be read as redefining the
nature of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty used in preemption analysis.
Although there is clear language which appears to define the backdrop of
tribal sovereignty in the more narrow terms of tribal immunity, 10 there is
also language which recognized that these two principles are distinct. For
example, the Court noted that "[u]nlike the authority to tax certain transactions on reservations, . . . tradition simply has not recognized a
sovereign immunity... in favor of liquor regulation by Indians"'10 8 and "we
must determine whether there is a tradition of tribal sovereign immunity
that may be repealed only by an explicit directive from Congress."' 0 9 In
fact, the Court appeared to focus its inquiry almost entirely on whether
there was a tradition of tribal sovereignty requiring an express grant of
state regulatory authority. Once it was determined that no tradition of immunity existed, section 1161 was construed to authorize state regulation of
tribal liquor transactions. 10 Therefore, the Court did not use notions of
tribal sovereignty in interpreting section 1161. This approach is consistent
with prior case law. As noted previously, preemption analysis requires an
examination of the state, tribal and federal interests at stake."' Since the
state has an overriding interest in regulating liquor transactions, little
weight should be given to the tribal interests when determining whether
have been
state law has been preempted. Although the language used could
2
clearer, this appears to have been the analysis used in Rice.1
The sovereignty analysis used in Rice is probably of little precedential
value. In addition to the lack of clarity, the court employed an alternative
rationale for its holding. When interpreting section 1161, the Court held
that even if there was a tradition of tribal immunity which required an express grant of state regulatory authority, section 1161 met this requirement. 113 In reaching this decision, the Court relied in part on the language
of the statute requiring liquor transactions to conform "both with the laws
of the State . . . and with an ordinance duly adopted" by the governing
tribe." 4 In an earlier case, United States v. Mazurie, the Court held that
this language constituted congressional delegation of authority to the
tribes to regulate reservation liquor transactions. The Court in Rice reasoned that if section 1161 indicated congressional intent to delegate authority
to the tribes, the language of the statute requiring conformity with the laws
of the state must indicate the same delegation to the states." 5 This construction creates a conflict betweeen state and tribal regulation. As noted
previously, the unavailablity of a California liquor license could preclude all
tribal regulation. In addition, the only ordinances which would not conflict
with state law would be those which are more restrictive. Since this would
put the tribe at a competitive disadvantage, it is unlikely that any ordinances would be passed.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 3296. See supranotes 84-91 and accompanying text.
Id. at 3297.
Id. at 3296.
Id. at 3299.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103 S.Ct. at 3302.
Id. at 3301 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976)).
103 S.Ct. at 3301.
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This conflict can be avoided if the language "the laws of the state" is
construed to refer only to state substantive law, such as the legal drinking
age, hours of operation, and Sunday closures. This was the construction
given to section 1161 by the appellate court. 116 In reaching this construction, the appellate court also relied on the language of the statute which requires liquor transactions to be "in conformity both with the laws of the
State in which such an act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly
adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such an area of Indian country." 1 17 The word "jurisdiction" specifically modifies the phrase "duly
adopted by the tribe," inferring that the jurisdiction has been conferred to
the tribes. In contrast, the phrase "laws of the State" is modified by the
phrase "in which such act or transaction occurs," which contains no
jurisdictional inference. Had Congress intended to cede jurisdiction to the
states, it could easily have done so by modifying "laws of the State" with a
phrase containing a jurisdictional grant, as it did in modifying "the tribe."
This grammatical interpretation led the appellate court to hold that section
1161 to be congressional recognition of "the tribe's jurisdiction over liquor
transactions, with the state functioning only as the source of law to be applied by the tribal government." ' 8
The appellate court also applied the doctrine of in parens materiain interpreting section 1161. This doctrine requires statutes which pertain to
the same subject matter to be construed together.1 19 The Court compared
section 1161 with other statutes regarding the applicability of state law in
Indian country to show that Congress knows how to use precise language
to grant regulatory jurisdiction to the states. The circuit court compared 18
U.S.C. section 1162(a)1 2 0 ("Each of the States... shall have jurisdiction
over offenses . . .") and 28 U.S.C. section 1360(a)121 ("Each of the States
...shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action.. .") with 18 U.S.C.
section 1161122 ("ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction.
. . ."). The similarity of the language used by Congress indicates it was the
Indian tribes who were granted jurisdiction over liquor transactions. In
light of the clear language used in other statutes pertaining to the same
subject matter, it is questionable that a mere reference to "the laws of the
State" should be construed to be a similar conferral of jurisdiction to the
states.
The Supreme Court dismissed this in-depth analysis in a single footnote
by finding congressional intent to be so clear that such an analysis was unnecessary.123 However, much of the legislative history offered by the Court
in support of its decision does not distinguish between state substantive law
and state jurisdiction over liquor transactions. 124 The one exception is a
116. Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1346 (1982).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
118. 678 F.2d at 1345.
119. Id. at 1345 n.9.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982).

121. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (a) (Supp. VI 1981).

122. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
123. 103 S.Ct. at 3302 n.17.
124. For example, the Department of the Interior's unofficial report urged an end to all prohibition on reservations as long as "transactions are not contrary to state law." Hearings
on HYR. 1055 Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on
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Senate Report which stated: "if this bill is enacted, a State or local
municipality ...if they desire, by the enactment of proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians, they may do sO. '"128
Just what was intended by the language "to restrict" is not clear. It may
only refer to application of substantive restrictions, such as the legal drinking age.
The Court placed heavy emphasis on an administrative opinion
prepared by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
which had been heavily involved in drafting the bill which became section
1161.126 A memorandum prepared by the Bureau Solicitor stated: "if any
person ... licensed by the State were to sell liquor on the reservation for
on-premises consumption in accordance with his license, presumably he
would be immune from State prosecution and, thus, the license issued by
the State agency would be fully effective as far as State law is
concerned."' 27 The Court in Rice stated that this opinion showed that the
to be subject to state laws, inBureau contemplated liquor transactions
28
cluding licensing requirements.1
The dissent in Rice viewed the implications of this memorandum differently:
[T]he sole question presented to the Solicitor . . was whether §
1161 authorized a tribe to limit the types of liquor sales permitted
in a reservation, i.e., whether the tribe could permit package sales
but not sales for on-premises consumption. The Solicitor stated
that the tribe could impose such a limit, and that an individual who
sold liquor for on-premises consumption would be subject to federal
prosecution even if he had obtained a state license.., presented in

this case ...129

When the Bureau Solicitor directly addressed this issue, he interpreted section 1161 not as a grant of jurisdiction to the states, but instead as only reof measure - to define
quiring "state liquor laws to be used as the standards
' 13 0
lawful and unlawful activity on the reservation."
Although the legislative history of section 1161 does not clearly resolve
whether the states were granted jurisdiction over tribal liquor transactions, it must be remembered that Rice does not involve an area where
there has been a tradition of sovereign immunity. Therefore, it was not
13
necessary that Congress expressly grant jurisdiction to the states.
Inteior and InsularAffairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. May 6, 1953). The sponsor of the bill
stated that "if this bill was passed.., the Indians would still have to comply with state
law in every regard... "Id. (June 2, 1953). Neither of these quotes clearly distinguishes
between substantive and regulatory state law.
125. S. REP. No. 722, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2399, 2400.
126. 103 S.Ct. at 3300.
127. Liquor-Tribal Ordinance Regulating Traffic Withing Reservation, No. M-36241 (Sept.
23, 1954), reprinted in II Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, at 1650.
128. 103 S.Ct. at 3300.
129. Id. at 3308 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Applicability of the Liquor Laws of the State ofMontana on the Rocky Boy's Reservation,
78 I.D. 39, 40 (February 3, 1971).
131. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, it is hard to believe that Congress intended to make tribal
members free from all but self-imposed regulation. The potential problems
which could develop were too great. In addition, the substantial state interest in regulating liquor transactions occurring within its borders make it
easier to find an implicit grant of state jurisdiction in both the language and
legislative history of section 1161.
One other proposition offered by the Court in support of its decision
was the history of concurrent state and federal regulation of the use and
distribution of liquor within Indian reservations.1 2 The Court said that
since the states had been permitted and even required to enforce federal
regulation through their own criminal laws, Congress did not retain exclusive jurisdiction of tribal liquor transactions. 133 The dissent in Rice gave
little credence to this proposition. The history of concurrent regulation did
not even suggest that the states had independent authority to determine
who should be given liquor licenses or the power to impose their own
regulations on tribal liquor transactions. 3 4 Any state law which conflicted
with the absolute federal prohibition would be struck down. 135 Since the
states would be preempted by federal law if they tried to place less restrictive regulations on the tribe, and since total prohibition made additional
restrictions unnecessary, state regulation was effectively precluded.
Therefore, the history of concurrent regulation offers little support for a
finding of independent state regulatory authority, and little support of the
Court's decision.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the Court in Rice was not willing to allow tribal
members to become "super-citizens" able to sell liquor free from all but
self-imposed regulation. In its haste to find a congressional grant of state
regulatory authority, the Court failed to articulate any basis which would
clearly support its decision. Therefore Rice supplies little clarification of
the complex question of state regulation of Indian reservations. If
anything, it added further confusion by appearing to redefine the notion of
tribal sovereignty used in preemption analysis in the more restrictive terms
of tribal immunity. If the Court was redefining tribal sovereignty, it is
unlikely that Rice will have much precedential value. In addition to the lack
of clarity in the opinion, the Court used an alternative basis for its holding
which made the resolution of the tribal sovereignty issue dicta.
Rice does, however, show the importance of the rule played by the state
interest in preemption analysis. If the states can show a substantial
regulatory interest, the Court will be more likely to find a grant of state
authority in less than explicit language.
JON T. DYRE
132.
133.
134.
135.

103 S.Ct. at 3297.
Id.
Id. at 3306 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
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